Iran Used 5,000 Secret Agencies To Import $2 Billion Military Hardware Despite US Sanctions: Report

Iran has built a secret network of military agencies with global reach that has imported at least $2 billion worth of hardware, explosives and heavy-duty trucks since January 2025, evading Western sanctions and a US naval blockade, a Reuters investigation has found.

More than 5,000 agencies operating under names beginning with the letters MOD, referring to the Ministry of Defence, form a vast financial and military procurement network. Shipping records dating back to 2016 reveal their financial activities, with some agencies linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and powerful business conglomerates known as bonyads, which are controlled by Iran's elite.

The findings shed light on a key question surrounding the war: how Iran has continued replenishing its missile and drone arsenals while firing thousands of munitions.

Secret Network Helped Iran Import Military Hardware

Between January 2025 and June 2026, a single agency, MOD 346428, imported large quantities of rocket propellants, explosives, weapons components and heavy-duty trucks that can be adapted for use as missile launchers.

The equipment entered Iran by land, sea and air, with shipping records listing China, Russia and Germany among its countries of origin.

Reuters based its investigation on thousands of Iranian banking and government records, corporate filings and import data. The agency's findings were developed in collaboration with 240 Analytics, an Israeli-American consultancy specialising in risk analysis.

The numbered agencies share an address in Tehran with Iran's Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics, or MODAFL. Their incorporation records list February 11, 1979, the date Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power following the overthrow of Iran's monarchy. However, documents indicate that most were actually established in 2013, when Iran was facing mounting sanctions and falling oil revenues.

The agencies operate through a network of intermediaries and foreign shell companies, collectively described as trustees. These entities use proceeds from illicit oil sales to purchase goods for Iran, creating a parallel foreign-trade system that helps the country circumvent restrictions.

Miad Maleki, a former senior US Treasury Department official who helped design America's sanctions programme against Iran, described the network as a critical supply line for the country's military.

The agencies have reportedly supported procurement for Iran's ballistic missile and drone programmes, helping it acquire materials used in attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure.

Billions Of Dollars In Purchases Through A Single Agency

MOD 346428 emerged as a particularly significant part of the network. According to Iranian customs statistics published in local media, its overseas purchases rose from $442 million in the 12 months ending March 2023 to $988 million in the following year, placing it among Iran's top 10 importers.

Reuters found that the agency imported $2.3 billion worth of military hardware between January 2025 and June 2026, according to records compiled by ImportGenius, a platform that tracks international trade.

The purchases included chemicals used in rocket fuel, explosives, aircraft engine components and heavy-duty vehicles. During the first six months of 2026, deliveries included $1.9 million worth of detonators, tonnes of explosives, rocket-fuel ingredients and vehicles that could be used to transport or launch missiles.

Weapons and sanctions experts who reviewed the findings said many of the materials could support Iran's missile and drone programmes, including the Shahed series. However, some of the goods have civilian applications as well.

Reuters cross-checked a portion of approximately 19,000 import records against shipping documents, social media footage and Iranian state media reports. The data showed that nearly all the items were exempt from duties and specifically classified as military equipment.

The investigation also found that 97% of the shipments reviewed were settled without international currency transfers. Instead, intermediaries using cash held in foreign bank accounts paid for the goods, reducing the likelihood of transactions triggering sanctions alerts.

Imports Continued Despite War And Naval Blockade

Iran continued receiving foreign supplies even after the war began on February 28, 2026, and despite restrictions on maritime trade.

Import data showed that monthly purchases initially fell by 47% in March to $54 million, compared with the previous month. They subsequently rose to $77 million by May.

Shipments arrived through several routes, including cargo vessels crossing the Caspian Sea from Russia, trucks travelling from Central Asia and freight aircraft from China.

In February 2026, a ship delivered 93 tonnes of unwrought Chinese titanium to the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The metal can be used to manufacture missile airframes and rocket-motor casings.

In the month before the war began, shipments also included 268 tonnes of nitrocellulose and 276 tonnes of other chemicals classified under codes that include perchlorates, which can be used to produce rocket propellants and explosives.

A shipment of $1.9 million worth of Russian detonators arrived in June 2026. The delivery was the last of five similar shipments since January 2025, which together brought in $7.6 million worth of detonators.

Iran's military also imported goods recorded as originating in the United Arab Emirates. Since the war began, the data showed that purchases worth $27 million had been recorded as coming from the UAE, nearly all arriving by sea. The latest such shipment, listed as electronics, arrived on June 27, nine days after the United States announced the suspension of its naval blockade. The blockade resumed in mid-July.

How The Network Was Discovered

Noam Binstok, a senior analyst at 240 Analytics, discovered the numbered agencies in June 2025 while uploading thousands of pages of Bank Sepah documents to his company's platform. The records had been obtained from Telegram and WikiIran, a website that publishes leaked documents relating to Iran's government.

Binstok initially focused on the bank records, which included account holders' names, identification numbers and balances. He later found that thousands of accounts belonged to agencies sharing the same naming pattern, registration date and Tehran address.

Thirty-six agencies held foreign-exchange accounts containing a combined $1.2 billion at the end of 2024. The remainder of the network held around $1.8 billion in local currency, with an average of approximately $360,000 per account.

Each agency had a unique 11-digit government identification number that appeared in Iran's corporate registry, shipping documents, invoices and bank records. These identifiers allowed investigators to trace purchases even when the agencies used front companies.

After identifying the scale of the network, 240 Analytics approached Reuters to help map the agencies and establish how they had continued obtaining military supplies.

Reuters said WikiIran confirmed that the documents it provided were authentic and that their origins had been verified through sources and contacts inside and outside Iran. The news agency could not independently establish the identities of the people operating the website.